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n  Even in a booming U.S. economy, 
some distressed places struggle 
with job availability, as prime-
age employment rates are over 8 
percentage points lower than in 
booming places.  
n  “Moving people to jobs” cannot 
solve the problem of distressed places: 
encouraging out-migration leads to 
a loss of jobs in that place of roughly 
equal percentage size to the loss of 
population.
n  “Moving jobs to people” increases 
local employment rates by three-
fourths more in distressed places than 
in other places, and these increases 
persist for decades. 
n  Current “place policies” are 
dominated by state business tax 
incentives, but these incentives are 
often costly per job created, and 
booming states frequently offer higher 
incentives than distressed states. 
n  Federal and state “place policies” 
should target distressed places; focus 
tax incentives on high-multiplier 
businesses; and invest in customized 
small-business advising, public 
infrastructure, land development, and 
job skills. 
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/
workingpapers/308/.
Even when the U.S. economy is booming, some places lack sufficient jobs. 
Consider “prime-age” workers, ages 25 to 54. The employment-to-population ratio 
(employment rate) for such workers varies greatly between booming and distressed 
places. Ten percent of the U.S. population lives in booming places, where the prime-age 
employment rate exceeds 83 percent. Another 10 percent, however, lives in distressed 
places, where the prime-age employment rate falls below 75 percent.
Lower employment in distressed places is associated with poorer mental health, 
substance abuse, crime, family breakdowns, and local fiscal problems. Children from 
distressed places end up with lower earnings as adults. 
What can policymakers do? One solution is to bring people to jobs, by subsidizing 
moves to places with growing employment. An alternative solution is to bring jobs to 
people, by creating more employment opportunities in distressed places. Currently, 
the typical “place-oriented” policy is a “jobs-to-people” strategy run by state and local 
governments, which offer tax incentives to businesses that promise to create jobs.
Mounting evidence suggests that “people-to-jobs” strategies have limited potential to 
solve the problems of distressed places. Although “jobs-to-people” strategies have greater 
potential, the current regime of tax incentive competition is often wasteful and needs 
reforms. To summarize:
• Because most individuals have strong ties to home, subsidizing out-migration 
induces only a small share to move.
• Out-migration reduces both population and jobs in equal proportion. A lower 
population depresses local demand, housing prices, and construction. Encouraging 
people to leave a distressed place thus does not make it easier for those staying 
behind to find jobs.
• On average, one-fifth of new local jobs created by incentives end up going to 
residents (rather than in-migrants).
• But this share rises to over one-third in distressed places, as new jobs in distressed 
places are more likely to help the local nonemployed.
• Nonetheless, the current state and local competition to lure businesses does not 
help distressed places, as booming areas offer tax incentives at least as large as those 
offered by distressed places.
• Moreover, current incentives favor large corporations, rather than the companies 
that are more likely to create downstream jobs. Current incentives are excessively 
long-term, which is ineffective because most businesses are focused on the short-
term. 
• Effective local job-creation strategies make the inputs businesses need to produce 
goods and services more readily available, something the private market does not 
always adequately do. These strategies include offering smaller businesses high-
quality advice on new technologies and new markets, upgrading local roads and 
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other infrastructure, providing land zoned and prepped for industry, and educating 
workers for the skills businesses need.
Encouraging Out-Migration from Distressed Places is a Bad Idea
 
Why focus on places? Shouldn’t helping people be our goal? And if people are best 
helped by moving out of distressed places, shouldn’t we encourage that out-migration?
We should focus on places because people care about them. Most people have strong 
ties to family, friends, and organizations in their hometowns. These ties are valued for 
their own sake, even if they may also be useful for other goals. If someone suffers a job 
loss or other crisis, one’s social network can often help. 
A good job in one’s home community therefore can be more valuable than a good job 
somewhere else. The costs of migration can involve sacrificing some of the value of home 
and community ties. Additionally, a community with fewer long-term residents can have 
lower “social capital”—weaker local organizations and civic participation.
Furthermore, encouraging out-migration may not only be a bad goal, it is often 
ineffective. Even sizable moving subsidies, of $10,000 or more, lead only a tiny fraction of 
residents to relocate. 
As Adam Smith said in The Wealth of Nations back in 1776, “A man is of all sorts of 
luggage the most difficult to be transported.”
If a distressed place has too few jobs, relative to population, encouraging out-migration 
might seem a good strategy to re-equilibrate the local labor market, reducing population 
to fit the available jobs. But this overlooks that out-migration also destroys jobs. The out-
migrants take away some spending that otherwise would have occurred, reducing local 
demand. Out-migration also reduces local housing construction and housing prices, and 
since spending is related to housing wealth, this can further reduce local demand. 
Consequently, when a local labor market’s population falls, evidence indicates that 
local jobs fall by a similar proportion. Out-migration thus does little to improve the 
employment rate.
Job Growth in Distressed Places Helps Both Locally and Nationally
Will adding jobs in distressed areas help the nonemployed? One could hypothesize 
that people moving in, attracted by new jobs, would quickly offset any short-term 
benefits for residents from more jobs. In this case, the new jobs simply encourage higher 
housing prices and gentrification. 
This pessimistic theory, however, is not borne out by empirical estimates. Even 10 
years after new jobs are added to a local labor market, employment rates there are higher. 
For every 100 new jobs created, 20 to 30 residents are employed who otherwise would 
not be. These long-run effects seem to persist even after two or three decades. 
Why can these long-term effects on employment rates persist, even after full 
migration adjustment? Because more jobs in a local labor market allow some residents, 
who otherwise would not be employed, to gain labor market experience. This extra job 
experience increases these residents’ job skills and self-confidence. As a result, these 
residents become more competitive in the job market: they are better able to get and 
keep jobs of higher quality. The extra labor market experience may even help the next 
generation be more successful.
Moreover, these benefits of job growth are asymmetric: local job growth effects are 
60−90 percent higher in a distressed place than in an average place. For every 100 new 
jobs, about 23 contribute to raising the employment rate in an average place, but 40 do so 
in a distressed place (Figure 1). 
Because of this asymmetry, creating jobs in distressed places raises national 
employment and output. The additional jobs created in distressed places draw people 
into productive employment, raising the overall effective national labor supply and 
economic output. 
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Encouraging out-
migration from distressed 
places does not help those 
left behind, as it reduces 
jobs in distressed places.
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These benefits are also modestly progressive in that the largest boost to income occurs 
among lower-income groups, who are less likely to be employed and stand to gain the 
most from greater job opportunities. 
Our Current State Competition for Jobs Is Not an Effective Way to Help Distressed Places
 
Governors and mayors currently try to attract jobs by granting tax incentives to 
businesses, to the tune of almost $50 billion annually. 
While these incentives may help attract jobs, they are not the best policy solution to 
help distressed places, for at least three reasons:
1) Incentives are not targeted at distressed places. The incentives that states offer 
generally are not related to underlying economic conditions. For example, Indiana’s 
incentives are twice as high as Illinois’s, even though these neighboring states have 
similar employment rates. Even within states, incentives are generally available to 
communities regardless of whether they are booming suburbs or distressed central 
cities or struggling rural areas.
2) Incentives are poorly designed. Incentives often last for 10 to 15 years, much 
longer than the salient period over which many business owners make location and 
expansion decisions. Incentives also go to all kinds of firms, with little concentration 
toward high-tech industries, which have been found to create greater numbers of jobs 
in related and downstream industries. To the extent that some firms are favored in 
being granted incentives, those favored tend to be large corporations. Governors and 
mayors appear to be tempted by the political benefits of current incentive policies: 
providing incentives to high-profile large corporations generates favorable public 
relations, and making incentives long-lasting defers the costs onto the next governor 
or mayor. Unfortunately, these features also do less to promote job growth.
3) Few resources go to job-creation policies that seek to improve business inputs 
and have proven to be relatively more cost effective. Customized business advice 
to small businesses, such as manufacturing extension services, has been shown to 
offer a return on investment of over five to one. Updating roads and other public 
infrastructure can effectively spur local job creation, as can providing industrial parks 
with land zoned and permitted for new business activity. Job-skills programs that are 
oriented to business needs, such as customized training programs designed around 
a specific business’s skill needs, also can be a cost-effective way of promoting local 
job growth. Despite these advantages, current place-oriented policies spend $6.50 on 
incentives for every $1.00 spent on targeting local business inputs (Figure 2).
Redistributing jobs to 
distressed places can raise 
national employment.
Figure 1  Share of Added Jobs That Raise LR Employment Rate in:
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Needed Reforms: Cut Back Wasteful Incentives, Enhance Local Business Inputs in  
Distressed Places
Reforms to current place-oriented policies are needed. Such reforms could come from 
state governments acting in their own residents’ interests. States could greatly increase 
the effectiveness of place-oriented policies through greater targeting of distressed places, 
cutting excessively long-term incentives, and placing more emphasis on public services to 
enhance business inputs. 
However, handing out long-term tax incentives to large corporations can bring large 
political benefits to elected officials, with costs paid by their successors, and this makes 
reform a challenge. In the absence of state policy changes, federal intervention should be 
considered.
 The federal government could consider levying a tax, maybe even as great as 100 
percent, on large tax incentives or cash grants that states make available to individual 
large corporations but not similarly situated smaller businesses. 
Such a tax would be consistent with a federal concern over the largest corporations 
having excessive power, yet it would still give considerable freedom to states to set 
their own tax policies. States could hand out investment tax credits or job creation tax 
credits, as long as businesses of all sizes were equally eligible. Moreover, this federal 
“incentive tax” could be administratively feasible, affecting only a manageable number 
of large corporations. For example, fewer than 1,500 firms have over 10,000 employees 
nationwide.
Federal policy could also provide a cash block grant to help enhance business services 
in distressed places. This grant could be used flexibly by state and local governments 
to bolster business services to smaller businesses, local infrastructure and land 
development, and job training. 
If the federal block grant program required that distressed places be targeted based 
on quantifiable criteria, then the program’s effectiveness could be rigorously evaluated. 
Targeted places could be compared with similar places that just missed the cutoff for 
being targeted.
 A federal block grant program with an annual cost of $20 billion could eventually 
create millions of jobs in distressed places. This job creation in distressed places would 
reduce the number of persons left behind by the economy, while enhancing overall 
national growth. 
Federal policy should tax 
excessive incentives to 
large corporations, and 
it should help distressed 
places by subsidizing local 
business inputs.
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Figure 2  Annual Resources, in Billions of Dollars, for Place Policies to Create Jobs: 
Incentives vs. Business Input Services 
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